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O objectivo desta tese passa por tentar compreender se a existência de 
accionistas com posições em múltiplas empresas de comunicações portuguesas 
(common-ownership) afecta ou não o preço que aquelas praticam aos seus clientes. 
Se o gestor de cada empresa procurar maximizar o retorno dos seus accionistas e 
existirem accionistas com posições em múltiplas empresas concorrentes, o gestor 
não irá procurar maximizar o lucro da empresa. Em concreto, o gestor deparar-
se-á com um potencial conflito de objetivos que poderá influenciar 
negativamente o funcionamento do mercado. Para responder a esta questão foi 
visto o impacto de um indicador de concentração, que capta a common-ownership 
(MHHI), sobre os preços praticados por cada empresa da indústria. Apesar de 
algumas análises preliminares o indicarem, os resultados obtidos demonstram 
não haver uma ligação entre preço e a concentração de common-ownership no 















Palavras-chave: Common-ownership, concentração de mercado, 
telecomunicações, Portugal.  
 
Abstract 
The objective of this thesis is to try to understand if the existence of shareholders 
with positions in multiple Portuguese communication firms (common-
ownership) affects or not the price practiced to their clients. If the manager of 
each firm seeks to maximize the return of their shareholders and there are 
shareholders with multiple positions in competing firms, the manager will not 
seek to maximize the firm’s profit. In particular, the manager will come across a 
potential conflict of objectives which might influence negatively the normal 
functioning of the market. To answer this question, it was seen the impact of a 
concentration index, which captures common-ownership (MHHI), over the 
prices practiced in each firm in the market. Despite a few preliminary analyses 
indicates, the obtained results demonstrate no link between price and the 















Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................ iii 
Resumo ........................................................................................................................... iv 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................... v 
Index ............................................................................................................................... vi 
Table Index ..................................................................................................................... 7 
Figure Index.................................................................................................................... 7 
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 8 
2 Literature Review ..................................................................................................... 10 
2.1 Theoretical Literature ........................................................................................ 11 
2.2 Empirical Literature ........................................................................................... 12 
3 Theoretical Model ..................................................................................................... 19 
3.1 Empirical Hypotheses and Empirical Methodology .................................... 22 
4 Empirical Application .............................................................................................. 24 
4.1 Data Description ................................................................................................. 24 
4.2 Data Limitations ................................................................................................. 28 
4.3 Preliminary Analysis ......................................................................................... 29 
4.4 Estimation Results .............................................................................................. 32 
5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 34 
References ..................................................................................................................... 36 
Appendix ...................................................................................................................... 38 
 
Table Index 
Table 1 - Table of descriptive statistics of equation variables. ......................... 27 
Table 2 - Results from OLS regression. ................................................................ 32 
 
Figure Index 
Figure 1- Relation between Price and HHI in all segment. ............................... 30 
Figure 2 - Relation between Price and MHHI in all segments. ........................ 30 
Figure 3 - Relation between Price and MHHI delta in all segments. .............. 31 
 
Figure A1 - Relation between Price and MHHI in mobile services segment. 38 
Figure A2 - Relation between Price and MHHI in fixed services segment. ... 39 
Figure A3 - Relation between Price and MHHI in double play segment. ...... 39 
Figure A4 - Relation between Price and MHHI in triple play segment. ......... 40 
Figure A5 - Relation between Price and MHHI in quadruple/quintuple play 




This paper is the first, to my knowledge, to examine the impact of common-
ownership on the Portuguese communications industry. The existence of 
common shareholders among companies, a fact very frequent in today’s world, 
can raise a few questions concerning the transparency on how these common 
owned companies conduct business and competition works (Schmalz, 2017). This 
can happen because there could be a conflict of interests between shareholders 
with and without stakes on competing firms of the same industry, forcing the 
manager to weight their different objectives. As a consequence, the goal of the 
manager would be to maximize the value of the portfolio of the firm’s 
shareholders more than the value of the firm (Antón et al., 2017).  
Common-ownership is becoming a growing problem given that there’s been 
a significant growth in private equity investment companies that typically invest 
in more than one firm within specific industries (Brito, Ribeiro & Vasconcelos, 
2017). Some of those companies and funds hold an increasing vast list of assets 
under management (e.g. BlackRock, Vanguard, Norge Bank, etc.), making this a 
concerning issue for almost all industries (Azar, Raina & Schmalz, 2016). 
In order to illustrate this issue, consider that, instead of undiversified owners, 
two firms in the same industry have common shareholders. If these two firms are 
the only firms active in the market, will they actively compete? If the manager of 
each firm maximizes their corresponding shareholder’s returns, as advocated in 
the literature, they will not have an incentive to compete, as it may reduce overall 
industry profit. This occurs with the investment funds mentioned above, which 
own an extensive amount of positions in multiple firms within the same industry. 
This is particularly visible in US industries (Schmalz, 2017). It is less evident in 
Portuguese industries, where the existence of shareholders with large positions 
 
is more frequent than in the U.S.. In family owned publicly traded companies or 
in any other publicly traded companies where there is a majority position in a 
single undiversified investor, similar to a large portion of Portuguese firms, the 
risk is significantly lower. The risk is lower because the actual control rights and 
influence power of a smaller investor, when there’s a majority position 
established by someone else, is inferior. 
The objective of this thesis is to examine if these situations are visible, through 
regression, on the Portuguese communication industry similarly to the U.S. and 
if so what are the consequent impacts. For this thesis it was necessary to gather a 
great deal of information, the data collected is consisted of market specifics, 
ownership information on firms and additional complementary information, 
mainly comprised of statistics.  To examine the impact on price, the delta of a 
common-ownership index, named MMHI, was brought to the regression which 
together with other variables created the equation. The estimation results reveal 
that, despite common-ownership being present in a small scale through the 
studied firms, there is no effect of common-ownership on the price practiced. 
This thesis is organized as it follows: chapter 2 reviews the literature, chapter 
3 presents the theoretical model, chapter 4 describes the empirical application 
and presents the estimation results, and chapter 5 concludes.
 
2 Literature Review 
This thesis lays its fundamentals on previous papers done essential in the 
U.S.A. and the purpose of this chapter is to present these different opinions and 
concepts originated from distint authors and papers with the purpose of 
demonstrating the theoretical and empirical foundations for this work.  
There’s been an increase in concern regarding whether common-ownership in 
competing firms affects the normal functioning of a market or not. The idea and 
the concern appear to be simple: market competition shrinks prices which hurt 
profits and, consequently, owners. If a single owner is diversified on different 
concurrent companies, then there is an interest and a possibility on improving 
margins and increasing prices (Schmalz, 2017). Thus investors have incentives to 
acquire positions in multiple firms in an industry to achieve increasingly 
monopoly benefits (Rubinstein & Yaari, 1983), motivations to diversify their 
portfolio by maximizing industry profits instead of individual firm profits 
(Gordon, 2003). 
Common-ownership was first introduced by Bresnahan & Salop, (1986) and 
then developed by Salop & O’Brien, (2000), which referred to this as a conflict of 
objectives which forces the manager to maximize a weighted average of the 
profits where the shareholders have rights. They also estabilish that it’s possible 
to relate price with the concentration index throught the Cournot model.  
One of the most used indicators to check anti-competitive effects and market 





2.1 Theoretical Literature 
 
HHI or Herfindahl Hirschman Index, as described in Calkins (1983), is a 
method used to measure the concentration of an industry. It is computed as the 
sum of the squared market shares of each firm in the industry and it ranges from 
almost 0 to 10.000 (the closest to zero, the less concentrated is the market and the 
more it resembles perfect competition).  
The HHI can be related to the average price in the industry as follows: the 
higher the HHI, the more monopolistic is the market and, as a consequence, the 
higher the price (since economic theory postulates that prices tend to be higher 
in less competitive markets). This implies that HHI should have a positive 
correlation with the prices of the industry. This relationship between prices and 
the HHI can be formally derived under the Cournot model of quantity 
competition and some models of ordered bargaining (Brito et al., 2017).1,2 
However, this relationship between industry prices and the HHI is derived 
assuming that each firm in the industry maximizes its own profit. O'Brien &  
Salop (2000) show that, under common-ownership, this relationship changes. 
They show that when firms are Cournot competitors, industry prices are not 
related to the HHI but, instead, to a modified version, named modified 
Herfindahl Hirschman index (MHHI). The MHHI considers not only the market 
shares of the firms in the industry, but also the weighting of the shareholders 
returns by the manager of each firm, computed from the voting and financial 
ownership stakes of the shareholders in the different firms. The difference 
between the MHHI and the HHI captures the concentration due to common-
ownership. 
                                                 
1 Cournot model of competition was an economical model, developed by Augustin Cournot, which described an 
industry of homogeneous products where the firms could only choose quantities and the prices varied 
accordingly. 
2  The HHI was introduced on the U.S. justice department in 1982, complementing former measures like 
concentration ratios. 
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2.2 Empirical Literature 
 
The empirical impact of common-ownership on industry prices is not 
unanimous, with some authors establishing and quantifying a statistically 
significant relation between industry prices and common-ownership and some 
authors finding no such relationship. On this sub-chapter, I will first describe the 
literature that establishes the common-ownership/price relationship, and then 
the literature that finds no such relationship. 
Azar, Schmalz & Tecu (2017) were among the first to examine the impact of 
common-ownership on firm’s objectives and market outcomes. To do so they 
focus on the U.S.A. airline industry. This industry was chosen because (i) it has a 
good amount of available data that enables each route to function like a separate 
market, therefore limiting potential concerns regarding the results found and (ii) 
for the substantial amount of common-ownership that occure in this industry. 
The data used by Azar, Schmalz & Tecu (2017) was obtained via three different 
sources: (i) Department of Transportation’s Airline Origin and Destination 
Survey (DB1B) database for information regarding flights and passengers on 
quarterly basis with the purpose of obtaining information on prices (the 
explained variable) and quantities (to compute market shares, an input of the 
MHHI), (ii) Bureau of Economic Analysis for population statistics to construct 
control variables like population and income per capita and (iii) Thomson-
Reuters Spectrum dataset on 13F filings to obtain the ownership (voting and 
financial) information required to construct the weighting scheme of the manager 
of each firm (another input of the MHHI). The final data consisted of over a 
million observations on a market-carrier level for a subset of 16 quarters between 
2011 and 2014. In order to examine if common-onership impacted industry 
prices, Azar, Schmalz & Tecu (2017) performed a OLS regression of the log of the 
average price per airline carrier at a specific time and route on the difference 
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between MHHI and HHI (delta of MHHI, which reflects common-ownership ), 
the HHI, a high number of controls (log of flight distance, non-stop carriers 
operating in a route, low-cost carriers operating on the route, geometric average 
of per capita income in the two endpoints in the route, the geometric average of 
population in the two endpoints in the route and the share of passengers who 
use connecting flights), and year and market-time-carrier fixed effects. The 
equation is represented as follows:  
 
log(𝑝𝑟𝑗𝑡) = 𝛽 𝑀𝐻𝐻𝐼 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛾 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡𝑟 + 𝜽 𝐗𝑟𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜗𝑟𝑗 + 𝜀𝑟𝑗𝑡, 
 
where the 𝑝𝑟𝑗𝑡  stands for the average price for carrier j in route r at quarter t, 
𝑀𝐻𝐻𝐼 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡  is the difference between MHHI and HHI as explained above in 
route r at quarter t, 𝐗𝑟𝑗𝑡  is a vector of the controls mentioned above, αt are 
quarterly time fixed effects and 𝜗𝑟𝑗 is route/carrier fixed effects. 
Azar, Schmalz & Tecu (2017) show that the coefficient of the MHHI delta is 
positive and statistically significant even with all the controls accounting for 
possible differences in price. These results display that an increase in the MHHI’s 
delta can lead to an increase of average fares by 4%. Despite being, by their 
understanding, not totally conclusive, these findings prove a link between prices 
and who controls the firms, in this case the carriers, on each of the specific routes. 
Azar, Schmalz & Tecu (2017) aim, with their investigation, raise awareness for 
the fact that common-ownership should be taken serious for market 
concentration calculations and that can indeed influence the competitiveness of 
an industry. 
Azar et al. (2016) also examined the effects of common-ownership (and cross-
ownership) on industry prices3. To do so, they focus on the US banking industry 
                                                 
3 Cross-Ownership is similar to common-ownership except that the first relates to firms owning directly other 
firms instead of investors having positions in multiple firms. 
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and use a different estimation strategy. Instead of using the MHHI delta as 
explanatory variable, like in Azar, Schmalz & Tecu (2017), they use the MHHI 
individually and compare the estimation results with the ones that result from 
using the HHI, which incorrectly assumes that each company is owned by 
undiversified investors. Azar et al. (2016)’s idea is to examine whether banking 
fees and deposit rates are affected by shareholders having several positions in 
competitors within the same market. The idea rose from the fact that, despite 
having more competitors and a lower HHI, banks from New York and California 
area have higher banking fees and lower deposit rates compared to banks from 
different areas of the USA. 
The data used by Azar et al. (2016) was obtained via three main sources: (i) 
RateWatch for branch level bank rates and fees which represent the prices they 
seek to explain, (ii) FDIC’s Summary of Deposits for branch level deposit rates in 
order to calculate market shares (an input of the MHHI), and (iii) Thomson 
Reuters 13f to obtain the ownership (voting and financial) required to construct 
the weighting scheme of the manager of each firm (another input of the MHHI). 
The final data consisted of over 60 million branch-county-year observations. In 
order to examine if common-ownership impacted industry prices, Azar et al. 
(2016) used three different methods: an OLS regression, an instrumental 
variables regression, and a difference-in-differences regression. The main one 
was the OLS regression while the others were robustness checks. In the OLS 
regression, they explain the price of banking services as a function of the HHI or 
the MHHI and controls like the log of the county’s median household income, 
the log of the county’s population, the bank’s market capitalization, as well as 
branch and year fixed effects. The estimated equation was as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑏𝑡 = 𝛽 Concentration Index𝑖𝑡 + 𝜽 𝑿𝑖𝑡 + ℇ 𝑄𝑏𝑡 + 𝜐𝑗 + 𝜁𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑏𝑡, 
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where the concentration index variable denotes HHI and MHHI separately in 
each regression in county i and year t, 𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑏𝑡 stands for prices (various fees, fee 
thresholds, and deposit interest rate spreads) in branch j of bank b in county i and 
year t, 𝑿𝑖𝑡 includes the log median household income and log population used 
as controls for county i and year t, 𝑄𝑏𝑡 represents the market capitalization of 
bank b in year t, 𝜐𝑗 is a branch indicator variable and 𝜁𝑡 is time indicator variable. 
Azar et al. (2016) show that, in fact, who owns the bank has an impact on 
industry prices, impliying that, at least to some extent, managers maximize 
shareholder’s returns. The comparation between the results obtained from 
measure industry concentration via the HHI or MHHI indicates that the HHI is 
insufficient to address market concentration issues in some areas where 
common-ownership exists. As a consequence, Azar et al. (2016) raise the issue of 
regulatory and anti-trust laws to protect and prevent common-ownership 
acquisitions that lessen the market ability to function normally. 
To examine thoroughly the issue of common-ownership, it is necessary to 
review also non-concordant literature since it provides a different insight into the 
issue and highlights the potential weaknesses of the previous, concordant, 
literature. 
Kennedy et al. (2017) criticize the approach of Azar, Schmalz & Tecu (2017) 
and Azar et al. (2016) for examining the relationship between industry prices and 
the MHHI. They argue that previous results and estimations may suffer from an 
endogeneity problem (i.e. price shocks may also change the concentration index) 
and that it depends too heavily on key assumptions that may or may not hold, 
especially the one that assumes that any shareholder who holds an ownership 
stake (no matter how small it is) in a firm may influence its manager. As a 
consequence, Kennedy et al. (2017) question if common-ownership justifies 
regulatory action like mergers do. In particular, they argue that common 
institutional owners bring benefits to the market, which could be affected and 
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reduced by the introduction of regulatory constraints. The fact that common 
institutional owners fund firms is positive to the economy since it creates growth. 
Thus, Kennedy et al. (2017) argue that regulators should not apply regulatory 
actions if not necessary, and that such actions will only harm firms’ performance. 
Kennedy et al. (2017) propose to estimate the effects of common-ownership by 
introducing oligopoly theory into O'Brien & Salop  (2000)’s theory of partial 
ownership. They apply their framework to  Azar, Schmalz & Tecu, (2017) 
common-ownership airline ticket price setting. The data used was a subset of 16 
quarters (ranging from 2011 to 2014) and markets with the geometric mean of 
population > than 2 million in the fourth quarter of 2014, from four sources: (i) 
Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) for complete airline information 
containing ticket prices, passengers together with flight origin and destination, 
(ii) Air Carrier Statistics (T-100) database as a complementary source for the same 
information as the previous, (iii) Equity Ownership Current and Historical 
Americas by Thompson Reuters for quarterly information on voting and non-
voting shareholders, and (iv) population and income data from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) as controls. The complete data produced 137,461 
observations. The estimation that greater contributed to their findings was the IV 
estimation of the following structural demand and supply model: 
 
Demand-side 
ln (s𝑗𝑟𝑡) − ln(s0𝑟𝑡) = 𝚾𝑗𝑟𝑡𝜽 + 𝛼 𝑝𝑗𝑟𝑡 + 𝜎 ln(𝑠𝑗𝑟𝑡
𝑔
) + 𝜀𝑗𝑟𝑡, 
Supply-side 
𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑡 = 𝑝𝑟𝑡 − 𝑏𝑟𝑡(𝑠𝑟𝑡, 𝐶𝑡, 𝛼, 𝜎) = Χ𝑗𝑟𝑡𝜔 + 𝜇𝑟𝑡, 
 
where 𝚾𝑗𝑟𝑡 represents controls like the log of the average flight distance by rival 
carriers, the number of rival carriers, and the number of rival carriers offering 
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non-stop flight on a specific carrier j in each route r in quarter t, 𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑡  represents 
the marginal cost in route r in quarter t, 𝑝𝑗𝑟𝑡 denotes the price of carrier j in route 
r in quarter t, 𝑠𝑗𝑟𝑡
𝑔
 denote the within-market share of carrier j in route r in quarter 
t, and 𝑏𝑟𝑡(𝑠𝑟𝑡, 𝐶𝑡, 𝛼, 𝜎) stands for a vector of carriers price-cost margins in route r 
in quarter t. The estimation of this structural model involves three endogenous 
variables: the price, the common-ownership incentive term and the within-
market share. 
Although reduced-form price regressions show that common-ownership is 
correlated to industry prices, with positive and negative 4  effects being 
statistically significant, the estimation of the structural model suggests the 
parameter that scales the common-ownership incentive term as not statistically 
significant, meaning that it has no effect on industry prices. Furthermore, 
Kennedy et al. (2017) argue that previous literature, based on modified versions 
of HHI have equations that are not derived from economic theory and can have 
multiple interpretations. As a consequence, they argue that common-ownership 
does not require any sort of regulatory policy as it is not proved to affect industry 
prices and market normal functions. 
Gramlich & Grundl (2017) also advocate an alternative approach to MHHI to 
quantify the impact of common-ownership on industry prices. In particular, they 
focus on the weighting of the shareholders returns by the manager of each firm. 
This approach, in their opinion, has three main advantages: (i) it is more 
consistent to a wider range of competition models, (ii) it requires less data to 
estimate, and (iii) reduces endogeneity concerns. 
Gramlich & Grundl (2017) apply their proposal to the US banking industry. In 
particular, they use an OLS regression to examine the relationship between price 
(rates of deposits) and quantities (deposits) to the weights that the manager of a 
                                                 
4 Results achieved using OLS found positive effects of common-ownership on price while the IV regression found 
the opposite, negative correlation. 
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firm places on own-profit and the weight that places on its competitors profits. 
As controls, the two equations have fixed effects of bank-time and market-time. 
This approach differs from Azar et al. (2016)’s approach in the sense it relies on 
the weighting scheme of the manager but not on the vector of market shares, 
claiming that the MHHI approach could confuse the interpretation of results. The 
data used came from three different sources: (i) SEC 13f fillings to obtain the 
ownership data to construct the weighting scheme of the manager of each firm, 
(ii) RateWatch to obtain the rates and fees, one of the outcome variables, and (iii) 
Summary of deposits to obtain the quantity data, the other outcome variable.  
Gramlich & Grundl (2017) developed two estimation equations, one for the 
price and another for the quantity variable: 
 
𝑝𝑖𝑏𝑡 = 𝜃1𝑤𝑏𝑏𝑡 + 𝜃2?̅?𝑘𝑏𝑡 + 𝚯𝒑𝑿𝒊𝒃𝒕 + 𝜀𝑖𝑏𝑡, 
𝑞𝑖𝑏𝑡 = 𝜃3𝑤𝑏𝑏𝑡 + 𝜃4?̅?𝑘𝑏𝑡 + 𝛕𝒑𝑿𝒊𝒃𝒕 + 𝜀𝑖𝑏𝑡, 
 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑏𝑡 is the “price” (deposit rate) paid by bank b in county i and quarter t, 
𝑞𝑖𝑏𝑡 is the “quantity” (deposits) on bank b in county i and quarter t, 𝑤𝑏𝑏𝑡 is the 
weight that bank b places on its own-profit in quarter t, ?̅?𝑘𝑏𝑡 is the average weight 
that themarket competitors place on the profit of bank b in quarter t, and 𝑿𝑖𝑏𝑡 are 
bank-quarter and county-time fixed effects as controls.  
In contrast with Azar et al. (2016), Gramlich & Grundl (2017) results are mixed: 
(i) as for short-term products (CD’s < 3 months), the estimated coefficients 𝜃1 and 
𝜃2 are positive, suggesting that the weights have indeed an effect on price and 
quantity, (ii) as for bigger maturities, the magnitude of the same coefficients is 
estimated to be smaller, meaning that the weights have a very small effect on the 
price, also they found that at least one of the coefficients is estimated to be 
negative. Gramlich & Grundl (2017) aimed at developing a different approach to 
tackle the existing common-ownership issue. To some intent, their results are 
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consistent with the correlation between industry prices and common-ownership 
found in Azar, Schmalz & Tecu (2017) and Azar et al. (2016), but lacked 
significant implied magnitudes, meaning that large movements on the weights 
will only produce very small changes to the prices and quantities. 
 
3 Theoretical Model 
The focus of this dissertation is to answer the question of whether common-
ownership affects industry prices or not. It has been established in the literature 
that competition usually improves customer prices at the expense of firm profit, 
since firms will sacrifice price to improve market share and to drive competition 
out. This argument is supported by the Cournot model for imperfect competition 
under homogeneous products. Let 𝑝(𝑄) denote the demand function in which 
industry price responds negatively to aggregate quantity. Under the model 





𝜋𝑗 = 𝑝(𝑄)𝑞𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗
 (𝑞𝑗), 
 
where 𝑝(𝑄) denotes the industry price, 𝑞𝑗 denotes the quantity of firm j, 𝑐𝑗
 (𝑞𝑗) 
the cost of firm j, which is a function of the quantity of the firm, and Q denotes 
the industry quantity, which aggregates the quantities of the different firms.  
This maximization problem has the following first order condition, obtained by 









Rewriting the first order condition obtained above, it is possible to obtain an 



















with 𝑠𝑗 being the market share for firm j and 𝜂 the price elasticity.  
If, after this rearrangement, we multiply the expression by the market share of 






















we obtain the relationship between the HHI (computed as the sum of the squared 
market shares of each firm in that specific industry) and industry prices. The 
lower the price elasticity and the greater the concentration of the industry, the 
least competitive the market is and vice versa. With that in mind, measuring 
market concentration (using the HHI) is important to identify potential situations 
where anti-trust or regulatory policies should be pursued. 
What if firms are not owned by undiversifed owners? Will the relationship 
above still arise? The answer is no. The relationship between industry prices and 
the HHI arises with undiversified owners, but not in face of common-ownership. 
In order to see why this is the case, consider the following illustration in which a 
set of owners have stakes in a single firm and a set of owners have stakes in two 
competing firms. The owners with stakes in both firms will wish that the 
competition between the firms should be less aggressive than the owners with 
stakes in a single firm. Therefore, when firms are owned by diversified investors, 
managers must weight a possible conflict of interest. The manager of firm j will 
 21 





∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗(∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑘𝜋𝑘
𝑁
𝑘=1 ) = ∑ (∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝛽𝑖𝑘
𝑀








where 𝛾𝑖𝑗 represents the voting rights of owner 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑀 in firm j, 𝑅𝑖 denotes 
the return of investor i, 𝛽𝑖𝑘 denotes the financial rights of owner i in firm k and 
𝑙𝑗𝑘 denotes the weight that the manager of firm j allocates to the profit of firm k, 
which will be a function of the voting rights of the owners of firm j in the firm 
and of the financial rights of the owners of firm j in firm k.  
Dividing the maximization problem by 𝑙𝑗𝑗  and rearranging the first order 
condition in the way it was done for the HHI, uncovers a relationship between 


























where 𝑤𝑗𝑘  denotes the (normalized) weight that that the manager of firm j 
allocates to the profit of firm k, which reduces to 𝑤𝑗𝑘 = 0 for 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘 if no common-
ownership is present in the industry, yielding MHHI=HHI.  
In vector notation, we can compute the MHHI as follows: 
 




where the s denotes a Nx1 vector of market shares of each firm, 𝐈𝑁 denotes the 
identity matrix and W denotes the normalized weight NxN matrix which 
captures, as discussed above, the weight of each firm imposes on itself and 
others. This latter matrix can be computed in vectore notation, as follows: 
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𝐖 =  𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔 (𝐂T 𝐅)−1𝐂T 𝐅, 
 
where C represents a MxN matrix of the voting rights and F represents a MxN 















3.1 Empirical Hypotheses and Empirical Methodology 
 
The empirical question of whether common-ownership affects prices in the 
Portuguese communications industry or not can be stated as the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H0: The existence of common-ownership influences industry prices. 
 
There is also the possibility of this hypothesis being rejected even if common-
ownership does affect price, this can happen if the effect on price is erratic or has 
a negative correlation. Also important is which concentration index is better at 
predicting prices, if HHI is a better predictor of prices than MHHI this will 
indicate that common-ownership diminish the significance of variable HHI. This 
is a fact because the only difference, in this case, between MHHI and the HHI is 
the normalized weight matrix W which is what provides the common-ownership 
effect. 
In order to examine this hypothesis, I propose to estimate the following 
equation based on the reviewed literature: 
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log (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑓𝑠) = 𝜗 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽 𝑀𝐻𝐻𝐼 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑠 + 𝜽 𝑿𝑡 + 𝛼𝑓 + 𝜐𝑡 + 𝜚𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡𝑓𝑠 
 
where 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑓𝑠  is the price of service s from firm f in quarter t, 𝑀𝐻𝐻𝐼 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑠 
represents the difference of the concentration in service s and quarter t as 
measured by the MHHI and the HHI, 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡𝑠 is the concentration in service s and 
quarter t as measured by the HHI, 𝑿𝑡 is a vector of controls that includes the log 
of the GDP per capita of Portugal and the log of population, and 𝛼𝑡, 𝜐𝑡 and 𝜚𝑠 
denote firm, quarter and service-fixed effects, respectively. The 𝑀𝐻𝐻𝐼 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑠 , 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡𝑠 and log (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑓𝑠) are based in Azar, Schmalz & Tecu (2017) whereas the 
controls (per capita GDP and population) are derived from Azar et al. (2016). 
An alternative approach could be Kennedy et al. (2017)’s structural model, 
however such model is beyond the scope of this master’s thesis. Gramlich & 
Grundl (2017) model while corrected and, to my knowledge, uncontested on 
offering a different approach to the topic, lacks background literature explaining 
and backing their empirical methodology, especially, when compared to the 
approaches of Azar, Schmalz & Tecu (2017) and Azar et al. (2016). This fact 
proved to be significant on electing the equation for this thesis, eventually 
overcoming their model better ability to reduce endogeneity problems. 
Ultimately, the choice of the estimation equation was based in Azar, Schmalz 
& Tecu (2017) and Azar et al. (2016). The outcome variable, price, was 
transformed into a logarithm as, in my opinion, the impact of common-
ownership on industry prices is not linear. For the main explanatory variable, the 
literature suggests two options: (i) using both the HHI and the MHHI delta as in 
Azar, Schmalz & Tecu (2017) in a single equation or (ii) using the HHI and the 
MHHI in two equations as in Azar, Schmalz & Tecu (2017). I opted for the first 
option as it allows to capture the effects in a single estimation, plus it allows to 
separate the common-ownership effect from the HHI with the MHHI delta. 
Regarding the control variables, I adopted the control variables from the 
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literature that could be adapted to this different industry. I thus control for the 
effects of economic growth and population changes to industry prices. Finally, I 
followed the literature and also included fixed effects to the equation. In 
particular, I included firm, segment and quarter indicator variables with the 
purpose of reducing possible correlations with the error term, known as 
endogeneity problems. 
 
4 Empirical Application 
4.1 Data Description 
 
The resources gathered for this dissertation are comprised of three core 
sources of information: (i) the data collected from the Portuguese communication 
regulator regarding prices, market shares, products, revenues and users, (ii) 
ownership details about financial and voting rights of the different firms, 
collected from Thompson Reuters and (iii) country statistics from OECD to 
obtain population and GDP per capita. 
The first part of the dataset was gathered from the Portuguese 
communications regulator, ANACOM, which publicly provides quarterly 
reports5 containing major information about the industry and its key players. 
With access to this, I was able to extract: market shares of users and revenues, 
revenues and users for each specific firm and quarter compiling a full dataset of 
ten quarters, starting from 2015:Q1 to 2017:Q2. All this information was extracted 
for the following five different segments of activity: (i) mobile, (ii) fixed services, 
(iii) double play, (iv) triple play, and (v) quadruple/quintuple play. In most 
quarters and segments there are five players mentioned: MEO, NOS, Vodafone, 
                                                 
5 “Factos e Números” 
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Cabovisão (which includes Oni) and “others”. In some cases, the number of 
market players is lower than five as, for example, in the Quadruple/Quintuple 
play segment in 2015:Q1 there were only MEO, NOS and Vodafone operating. 
The second part of the dataset was obtained via Thomson Reuters historical 
ownership tab that provides information on a large part of the listed companies 
shareholders: on this case Vodafone Group PLC, Pharol SGPS (former PT SGPS) 
and NOS SGPS SA. The data was collected for the same ten quarters from 
2015:Q1 to 2017:Q2. Thompson Reuters retrieves its information directly from the 
companies and/or from the stock exchanges mandatory disclosure laws. It is also 
worth reporting that Altice bought MEO from PT SGPS in June 2015 and kept 
Cabovisão until regulators imposed a sale which eventually happened in 
September 2015. This implies that Altice controlled both firms in the second 
quarter of 2015 which is reflected in the calculations. Altice later sold Cabovisão 
to two French private equity funds, which are not listed in any stock exchange, 
making it impossible to determine any ownership details. From the third quarter 
of 2015 forward Cabovisão and “others” are represented by a single fictious 
investor which owns 100% of the capital. 
The third and final part of the dataset, the complementary data, was collected 
to obtain the controls variables referent to the Portuguese GDP per capita and 
population. Information was extracted from the Organization for Economical Co-
operation and Development (OECD) website via the dataset of quarterly national 
accounts. Furthermore, the data was collected for the same quarterly periods as 
the other data in U.S. dollars and in thousands of individuals, respectively. In 
order to convert US Dollars into Euros, I used the correspondent closing forex 
rate, for each ending quarter’s day (when impossible to use the exact date due to 
lack of rate, the immediately preceding date was used). 
The sample collected is thus a panel and contains information from different 
firms and segments over ten quarters. Concerning units of measure: prices and 
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GDP per capita are measured in euros, population is in thousands of individuals 
and the MHHI delta and HHI are represented by indexes points which range 
from close from 0 to 10.000. The remaining data is either in percentage points (i.e. 
market shares, ownership) or in users (people, mobile phones active, fixed land 
line telephones, etc.). Regarding units of observation: price is by firm-segment-
quarter, HHI and MHHI delta is by segment-quarter and the controls are only by 
quarter. This data is composed by fifty observations of fixed services and double 
play, forty-four observations of mobile services, thirty-nine of triple play and 
thirty-two of quadruple/quintuple play, adding up to two hundred and fifteen 
total. 
Alongside the more complex calculations done and explained through the 
theoretical model chapter, there were other steps that were made to treat the 
information gathered in order to fill this thesis needs. This was specially the case 
of ANACOM’s collected data, as it was detailed in the data description, the 
information provided was with a raw format. 
One of those examples is the price. The price variable was not directly 
extracted from ANACOM’s reports as it was not available. Revenues and users 
per firm and per segment was what was accessible, so I computed the price 
variable by dividing revenues with quantities (users). The actual partition of 
users and revenues per firm was also not directly reported. In order to obtain this 
data, segment-quarter revenues and users were multiplied with revenues market 
shares and user market shares, respectively. 
The Portuguese communication industry, composed by the above described 
five firms, ended 2017:Q2 with revenues of 905,071,441€ and had total number of 
accumulated users of 27,519,1376.While there is no clear market leader in all 
services, MEO stands off as the most influential player by having the biggest 
market share in four out of the five services (Quadruple – Quintuple (45.5%), 
                                                 
6 The sum of users for every service in 2017:Q2. 
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Double play (40.6%), fixed (41.3%) and mobile (43.9%)). MEO is followed close 
by NOS and Vodafone with the first being a market leader in Triple play (36.5%). 
Cabovisão and “others” represent smaller market players, focused on more 
traditional services, with even no activity in some services at this thesis time 
window. As an example of common-ownership present in 2017:Q2, the Norge 
Bank owned positions in three out of the five operating companies with 1.44% in 
Altice, 2.11% in NOS and 2.14% in Vodafone. The same can be said for The 
Vanguard Group with 1.14% in Altice, 0.97% in NOS and 2.42% in Vodafone. But 
these funds are not the only ones who are diversified in the Portuguese 
communications industry. A few more examples are: BlackRock, T. Rowe Price, 
Artemis Investment Management and Capital International Investors. This 
implies that the MHHI would be different than the HHI and that the MHHI delta 
would have positive values. 
Table 1 provides some summary statistics of the final dataset with 215 
observations: 
 
 Mean Median Std Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Price 76.92000 72.46000 57.61000 2.66000 225.31000 
HHI 3 498.40000 3 472.82000 437.81000 2 965.50000 4 565.94000 
MHHI Delta 318.15000 300.41000 129.66000 93.34000 660.93000 
GDPpp 27 568.37000 27 394.20000 1 086.80000 26 431.90000 29 565.03000 
Population 10 333.02000 10 329.47000 21.38000 10 304.51000 10 372.97000 
Table 1 - Table of descriptive statistics of equation variables. 
 
The results suggest (i) that median firm has a price of 72.46€ per segment and 
quarter, (ii) that the concentration, as measured by the HHI, of the median 
segment is of 3,472.82 index points per quarter, representing a highly 
concentrated market accordingly to the U.S. Department of Justice, (iii) that 
common-ownership increases the concentration, as measured by the MHHI 
 28 
delta, of the meadian segment by 300.41 index points per quarter, (iv) that in the 
median quarter the per capita annual GDP is of 27,568.37€, and (v) that in the 
median quarter the population is of 10,329,470 individuals. 
As we can see from the Table 1, while population and per capita GDP don’t 
vary much due to the short period of time of the observations, the other variables, 
on the other hand, do vary quite considerably. HHI is generally a stable index 
when there are no large market changes. In particular, there were some 
significant variations into the market shares when Altice bought MEO and kept 
Cabovisão which significantly increased market concentration and consequently 
lead to a regulator decision, despite that, overall there has not much variation. 
The MHHI delta, on the other hand, does have a larger variation with the 
standard deviation being roughly ½ of the median, indicating large changes in 
ownership. Prices also vary greatly from segment to segment and from firm to 
firm while the MHHI delta does seems to have larger values in more recent years 
implying more common-ownership. These differences are also amplified since 
the different segment were combined in the table. 
4.2 Data Limitations 
 
The process of gathering information contemplated difficulties that 
consequently originated in a few data limitations. First, the multiple adaptations 
and changes made to the statistics provided by ANACOM, due to the normal 
evolutions of this technological industry, created a very narrow time window for 
this thesis sample. This meant that it was only possible to start this analysis in 
2015:Q1 for three segments (different revenue data display) and 2015:Q2 for the 
triple and quadruple/quintuple play services (share market data by service was 
combined for this services) resulting in a small number of observations. 
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Second, fixed service part of the information, reported by ANACOM, was 
including all fixed services provided (phone, internet and cable television), 
standalone and in package. Since the package details are also presented in this 
study, the users and the revenues were calculated by subtracting package values 
to the values displayed in total, originating the fixed services amounts 
individually. 
Third, there were some differences regarding the data provided from 
ANACOM’s different reports. For the purpose of this thesis, only the market 
shares and revenues shares were extracted from the quarterly PDF’s versions of 
“Factos e números”, everything else was collected through excel version of 
“FactosNumerosHistorico2T2017”. 
Fourth, it is contemplated, in the calculations done, the changes that occurred 
between market players. On June 2nd 2015 Altice acquired PT segment of 
communications MEO meaning that, for ownership purposes, it was used PT 
SGPS ownership on previous dates and Altice NV for quarters after the date. Due 
to regulatory rules on September 15th 2015, Altice sold its Cabovisão and Oni 
participation to a French private equity named Apax France, also changing 
ownership calculations. 
Fifth, regarding ownership data, it was installed a floor on stakes lower than 
0,10%, meaning that lower participations weren’t regarded for this study and 
consequently it was assumed that there is no common-ownership among the 
excluded values. 
4.3 Preliminary Analysis 
 
Three main figures were constructed with the purpose of having a better 
understanding of the relations between the concentration variables and industry 
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prices. The results provided are still inconclusive but help to have a grasp on the 
subject. 
 
Figure 1- Relation between Price and HHI in all segment. 
 
Figure 1 shows an increasing slope regarding price when the market 
concentration index (HHI) grows. The information displayed is this figure is 
aligned with the theoretical model, indicating a positive correlation between the 
profit maximizing prices (under Cournot) and the HHI. 
 
 






























Figure 2 displays a positive slope between the MHHI and industry prices, 
suggesting that indeed common-ownership is influencing the overall prices of 
communications. Similarly, this figure also appears aligned with the theoretical 
model when joined by diversified investors. Appendix A presents a more 
detailed analysis, discriminated by segment. 
 
 
Figure 3 - Relation between Price and MHHI delta in all segments. 
 
Figure 3 displays, strangely, an opposite relationship between the MHHI delta 
and industry prices, in contrast with the two figures above. This suggests that the 
difference between MHHI and the HHI (capturing the concentration due to 
common-ownership) has a negative impact of industry prices. 
Despite the above results, it is not possible to draw final conclusions with just 























4.4 Estimation Results 
 
Table 2 presents the OLS estimation results of three specifications produced 
with 215 observations, which vary in the controls used, of the equation described 
in the theoretical model chapter.   
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
HHI 
-0.00026 -0.00004 0.00247 
(0.00020) (0.00025) (0.01905) 
MHHI Delta 
-0.00349*** 0.00065 0.07255 






 -104.28500** 49.03209 
- 
(52.05620) (41.80005) 
Firm Fixed Effects   ✔ ✔ 
Segment Fixed Effects   ✔ ✔ 
Quarterly Fixed Effects    ✔ 
       
R-squared 0.09800 0.74960 0.77600 
Table 2 - Results from OLS regression. 
*     With significance of 10%                           
**   With significance of 5% 
*** With significance of 1% 
The values displayed in the parentheses correspond to the standard errors. 
 
Specification (1) regresses the log of prices on the HHI, the MHHI delta and 
the GDP and population controls, without any fixed effects. The results suggest 
that (i) the HHI appears to have no impact on price; (ii) the MHHI delta, on the 
contrary, presents a statically significant coefficient with a negative effect on 
price, with an oddly decrease in 34.9% on price with an increase of 100 points in 
the MHHI delta; (iii) the per capita GDP has no impact on price, and (iv) the 
population appears to have a massive unexplained negative effect on price by 
decreasing it by roughly 104% with a 1% increase in population. The first 
 33 
regression bears a low R-squared of 0.09800 and the results are somehow 
unexpected, suggesting that further efforts to increase the quality of the 
regression are required. 
Specification (2) regresses the log of prices on the same explanatory and 
control variables but including firm and segment fized-effects to reduce possible 
endogeneity problems (HHI or MHHI delta correlation with the error term) of 
the first specification and, thus, improve overall results. The results suggest the 
following: (i) the HHI continues to have no impact on price, similar to the first 
regression above; (ii) the MHHI delta loses its effect on prices; (iii) the per capita 
GDP continues to have no impact on price, and (iv) the population also looses 
the effect exhibited previously. This regression displays no effect on price by any 
of its variables, despite being more complete than the (1) with the introducing of 
the fixed-effects and having a greater R-squared (0.74960). 
Despite improvements to the equation, it is still possible to decrease the 
possibility of endogeneity problems, in addition to previous specifications. 
Specification (3) adds quarterly fixed effects to produce the most complete 
regression done. Per capita GDP and population variables were dropped due to 
the fact that vary only by quarter, the same as the indicator variables added, 
inducing collinearity problems. The results suggest the following: (i) the HHI 
keeps on having no impact on price, similar to the specifications above and (ii) 
the MHHI delta also continues to have no effect on price. This regression had a 
R-squared of 0.77600, representing the highest one of the three. 
Using the final specification has the preferred one to draw the conclusions, 
since it is the most complete when compared to the others, the hypothesis 
formulated on this thesis must be rejected: the MHHI delta does not seem to 
influence industry prices. This result contradicts the findings in Azar, Schmalz & 
Tecu (2017) and Azar et al. (2016), who find clear links relating common-
ownership with industry prices. In contrast, this result (i) is aligned with the 
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findings in Gramlich & Grundl (2017), who find mixed results regarding the 
impact of common-ownership on industry prices and (ii) is similar in a way to 
Kennedy et al. (2017) opinion of common-ownership. 
 
5 Conclusion 
The theory behind this subject and multiple potential issues, brought by 
several discussed authors, about common-ownership do tend to be plausible 
and, in my opinion, should continue to be debated and developed. Regardless of 
the importance of this topic, overall the results do not suggest a strong and robust 
relationship between common-ownership and industry prices. In contrast to 
Azar, Schmalz & Tecu (2017) and Azar et al. (2016), they actually suggest that 
there is no effect of common-ownership on the prices charged by Portuguese 
communications firms and, therefore, this thesis, shares some of the conclusions 
of Gramlich & Grundl, (2017) and possible of Kennedy et al. (2017).  
The Portuguese communications market is not comparable in size to the US 
industries examined in the literature. Further, and most importantly, the firms 
competing in this industry do not have a striking evidence of common-
ownership when compared to the US airline and banking industries, with 
multiple owners having large positions in competing firms. In this specific case 
only a few funds have a significant yet small positions in multiple firms (i.e. 
Norges Bank and BlackRock), making this issue less of a concern. 
Based on this thesis, additional anti-trust and regulatory actions should not be 
pursued as the implicit benefits discussed brought by funds should overcome 
potential situations of conflict of objectives with owners. 
Additional efforts on this subject can be useful if performed on a different 
industry and specially with a larger time window to be able to have a superior 
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observation data. Furthermore, the use of instrumental variable techniques might 
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Figure A1 suggests that mobile services segment does appear to have an 
opposite relation to what would be the expected outcome: prices tend to be lower 
when MHHI is higher. Prices varies between close to 7€ to more than 40€ while 
MHHI starts at near 3,800 points and go to close to 4,100 points. 
 
 
Figure A1 - Relation between Price and MHHI in mobile services segment. 
 
Figure A2 shows a different situation if you ignore the spike resulting of Altice 
acquisition: it appears rather stable. The fact that fixed services is considered a 
mature segment with settled market players helps explaining the small variation, 
where prices vary from as small as 2€ till 22€ and MHHI goes from near 3,300 



















Figure A2 - Relation between Price and MHHI in fixed services segment. 
 
Figure A3 gives the same impression as Figure A2: the relation is also not clear 
despite the slope on this one being slightly more positive. Price on double play 
starts close to 55€ and goes to almost 110€ where MHHI varies from roughly from 
3,250 points to more than 3,500 points. 
 
 



































Figure A4 also displays a small positive slope on the linear line proving the 
economic theory behind this topic. It is also visible the impact of Altice 
acquisition on triple play market concentration with a peak reaching 
approximately 3,900 points where the lowest was around 3,200 points. Price is 
greater than previous one, establishing from about 70€ till roughly 115€. 
 
 
Figure A4 - Relation between Price and MHHI in triple play segment. 
 
 
The results on the last segment presented, quadruple/quintuple play, are more 
significant than previous ones with a much larger slope. This is a relatively new 
segment where there are currently only three firms operating. Alongside having 
a greater HHI due to the number of competitors, the MHHI is also larger due to 
the three firms present are listed are have common-ownership. MHHI varies 
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